How do trade liberalizations a¤ect relative factor prices and to what extent do they cause factors to reallocate across sectors? We …rst present a general accounting framework that nests a wide range of models that have been used to study the link between globalization and factor prices and from which we obtain two su¢ cient statistics that determine factor prices. Under some restrictions, changes in the "factor content of trade" (FCT) fully determine the impact of trade on relative factor prices.
Introduction
How do trade liberalizations a¤ect the skill premium, or relative factor prices more generally, and to what extent do they cause factors to reallocate between sectors and across producers within sectors? This paper o¤ers a unifying perspective on the fundamental forces that shape factor prices and factor allocation in a global economy. In the …rst part of the paper we present a general accounting framework from which we obtain su¢ cient statistics that determine factor prices. In the second part of the paper we study the impact of trade on these su¢ cient statistics (and, hence, on factor prices and factor allocation) in a speci…c model, nested by our general framework, that uni…es traditional models of trade and factor prices featuring sectoral productivity and factor endowment di¤erences and new models featuring imperfect competition and heterogeneous producers.
The general accounting framework that we present in the …rst part of the paper nests a wide range of international trade models such as the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model, which emphasizes di¤erences in factor intensities across sectors and factor endowments across countries. It also nests other models-emphasizing, e.g., di¤erences in skill intensities between exporters and non-exporters within sectors, di¤erences in the tradeability of skill-intensive and unskill-intensive goods, and complementarities between skilled labor and traded goods such as capital 1 -that have been used to study the link between international trade and relative factor prices. While we focus on factor prices and between-factor inequality, the framework also covers recent models featuring unemployment, within-factor heterogeneity, and within-group inequality. 2 We show that within this framework, each factor price can be expressed as the product of two components. The …rst component is the inverse of the trade-adjusted factor supply, which is the domestic employment of that factor less the factor content of trade (FCT) . The FCT of a given factor is the quantity of that factor embodied in the country's net exports. A decrease in the trade-adjusted factor supply increases the factor's price, just like a decrease in its domestic supply. The second component is the factor payments for domestic absorption, which is the counterfactual payments to that factor if domestic sectoral absorption were produced domestically; this component depends on domestic sectoral expenditure shares and factor shares in sectoral revenues. An increase in the average revenue share of a factor increases the price of this factor.
We use this decomposition to show how various speci…c models and mechanisms operate through these two components. More generally, this decomposition provides a single lens to view and compare a wide range of models and mechanisms linking trade and technology to factor prices. Under some restrictions, the decomposition simpli…es further. In particular, we provide conditions under which the ratio of factor payments for domestic absorption between any two factors is constant across equilibria, so that changes in relative factor prices depend only on changes in trade-adjusted factor supplies. Hence, in any model satisfying these restrictions, if the domestic supplies of two factors are …xed, then changes in the FCT for these two factors are su¢ cient statistics for the impact of trade on the relative price of those two factors: changes in the economic environment-such as trade costs, foreign productivities, foreign factor supplies, foreign production functions, domestic productivities, or domestic supplies of other factors-a¤ect domestic relative factor prices only through changes in the FCT. Moreover, we show that under these restrictions the FCT can be constructed using industry-level trade and production data.
3 A similar result has been obtained previously by Deardor¤ and Staiger (1988) and Deardor¤ (2000) in perfectly competitive environments with constant returns to scale and common production technologies across producers within sectors. Deardor¤ and Staiger (1988) motivated a substantial number of empirical studies; see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Krugman (1995) . We show that this empirical approach remains valid in signi…cantly more general economic environments featuring, for instance, imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale, heterogeneous producers, and/or …xed costs of exporting.
4
While our general framework provides a single lens to view and compare a wide range of models and mechanisms linking trade and technology to factor prices, and makes a clear link between the FCT and factor prices, it takes the FCT as given. Without any further structure, this accounting framework does not provide insights into how changes in the economic environment, such as changes in trade costs, a¤ect the FCT and relative factor prices.
In the second part of the paper we study the determination of the FCT and the impact of trade liberalization on factor prices and factor allocation in an environment that combines a number of key elements of an important class of workhorse models in international trade. To maintain analytic tractability, we specialize the general framework above to an environ-ment with two-countries, two-factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and two-sectors, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. We allow for sectoral productivity di¤erences across countries, as in the Ricardian model, and we introduce monopolistic competition and heterogeneous …rms, as in Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) . While this model is signi…cantly less general than our accounting framework, it provides a uni…ed environment to study analytically how the FCT, factor prices, the extent of between-sector factor reallocation, and the extent of between-sector trade are all shaped by cross-country di¤erences in factor endowments and sectoral productivities, as in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian models, and by …rms'decisions to enter and to operate in each market, as introduced in the recently developed models of monopolistic competition and heterogeneous producers.
In this model, a reduction in trade costs induces countries to expand production and exports in their comparative advantage sector and contract production elsewhere, as in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian models. This between-sector reallocation lowers the trade-adjusted supply of the factor used intensively in the comparative advantage sector (by raising its FCT) and hence raises its relative price, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. This e¤ect, which is often referred to as the Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect, is the only channel through which trade a¤ects factor prices (in contrast to the general framework) because the ratio of factor payments for domestic absorption between any two factors is constant in this environment. Moreover, in this model changes in the FCT fully determine not only changes in the skill premium, but also changes in the extent of between-sector factor reallocation and between-sector trade.
Our main objective in this second part of the paper is to study how the impact of trade liberalization on the FCT, the skill premium, the extent of between-sector trade, and the extent of factor reallocation is shaped by the new margins of heterogeneous-…rm trade models that are absent in standard Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian models; e.g., the extent of productivity heterogeneity and heterogeneous …rms' decisions to enter and operate in each market. To provide intuition for these comparative static exercises, we …nd it useful to relate the implications of these new margins to the well-known e¤ects of changes in exogenous Ricardian comparative advantage. In particular, exploiting the model's simple expressions for sectoral trade shares, we show that an increase in the mass of country 1 …rms that sell in a given destination market in a given sector is equivalent-in terms of its impact on the FCT, the skill premium, between-sector factor reallocation, and between-sector trade-to an increase in country 1's exogenous Ricardian productivity in that sector. The mass of …rms selling to a given destination increases either because of an increase in the mass of entering …rms or because of an increase in the fraction of entrants that operate in the destination. Moreover, the extent to which changes in the mass of …rms selling in each destination a¤ects the FCT depends on the degree of within-sector productivity heterogeneity. In this sense, the strength of exogenous sources of comparative advantage (resulting from sectoral productivity di¤erences and factor endowment di¤erences) is shaped by the decisions of …rms to enter and to sell in each destination market.
We use this logic to obtain the following results on the impact of trade liberalization on the FCT, the skill premium, the extent of between-sector factor reallocation, and the extent of between-sector trade. We …rst show that greater within-sector productivity heterogeneity reduces the magnitudes of the changes in the FCT, the skill premium, the extent of between-sector trade, and the extent of factor reallocation induced by a given change in trade shares. This is because greater technological heterogeneity mitigates the relative importance of exogenous Ricardian technological di¤erences and factor price di¤erences in shaping sectoral trade patterns. Given the extensive evidence of large productivity di¤erences within narrowly-de…ned sectors, this comparative static exercise provides a rationale for empirical results suggesting that the FCT is not very large for many countries like the US, and that the extent of between-sector factor reallocation induced by trade and its impact on the skill premium are small in practice; see e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) .
We next show that endogenous entry and endogenous selection of …rms into markets each increases the magnitudes of the changes in the FCT, the skill premium, the extent of betweensector trade, and the extent of factor reallocation induced by a given change in trade shares. This is because the mass of entrants from country 1 relative to the mass of entrants from country 2 and the fraction of these entrants from country 1 relative to the fraction of these entrants from country 2 that choose to sell in any given market is relatively larger in country 1's comparative advantage sector than in country 2's; and an increase in the mass of …rms that supply a given market is equivalent to an increase in that sector's exogenous Ricardian productivity. These results imply that measures of sectoral productivity and endowment di¤erences across countries would underestimate the impact of trade liberalization on the skill premium and between-sector factor reallocation if …rm entry and selection decisions are not taken into account. Note, however, that given our earlier results, the extent of withinsector productivity heterogeneity, endogenous entry, and selection of …rms into markets have no e¤ect whatsoever on changes in factor prices, between-sector factor allocation, or betweensector trade, for given changes in the FCT.
Our results are related to recent papers in international trade identifying robust insights for welfare analysis across di¤erent models; see e.g., Arkolakis, Costinot, and RodriguezClare (Forthcoming) and Atkeson and Burstein (2010) . Whereas these papers focus on the welfare implications of international trade, we focus on the distributional implications of international trade. We show that across a wide range of workhorse models, the e¤ects of international trade on the skill premium can be summarized by changes in the FCT.
The second part of our paper is most closely related to Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) , henceforth BRS, which consider a very similar framework. As in other models with factor-endowment di¤erences across countries and factor-intensity di¤erences across sectors, we both obtain standard Heckscher-Ohlin-like results: trade generates factor reallocation and a Stolper-Samuelson-type e¤ect. Our contribution relative to BRS is as follows. First, we show that changes in the FCT are su¢ cient statistics for the impact of international trade on the skill premium and between-sector factor allocation. Second, we demonstrate analytically how the new margins in heterogeneous-…rm models (the extent of within-sector productivity heterogeneity, endogenous entry, and selection of …rms into markets) a¤ect the impact of trade on the skill premium, between-sector trade, and factor reallocation. In particular, while propositions in BRS state that the new margins in heterogeneous …rm models do a¤ect the aggregate implications of trade liberalization, none of their analytic results establish how any of these margins a¤ects the skill premium, the extent of factor reallocation, or the extent of between sector trade, whereas this is the focus of the second part of our paper. Third, we revisit their …nding that di¤erences in factor endowments induce what BRS call "endogenous Ricardian productivity di¤erences" at the industry level. In this section we present a general accounting framework to examine the link between factor prices and trade. We …rst derive a simple expression relating equilibrium factor prices to two components: the trade-adjusted factor supply and factor payments for domestic absorption. We then show how changes in relative factor prices within a range of workhorse models of trade can be mapped into these two components. Finally, we describe a set of assumptions that are standard in the literature under which changes in the FCT are su¢ cient statistics for the impact of trade on relative factor prices.
General Framework
There are N countries, indexed by n = 1; :::; N , and J sectors, indexed by j = 1; :::; J. Production requires inputs, and inputs are grouped into disjoint sets of factors, indexed by k = 1; :::; K. Factors could be highly aggregated, e.g. capital and labor, or highly disaggregated; e.g. workers with a given number of years of education. Inputs within a given 5 Ho (2010) uses a similar framework to study the implications of idiosyncratic distortions on betweensector factor allocation, the skill premium, and welfare, while Lu (2010) uses it to study how export market participation decisions of Chinese …rms vary across sectors. factor set k can be heterogeneous in all respects; e.g. the e¢ ciency units provided by each input of factor k can vary within …rms in a sector and across sectors.
In a given equilibrium and at a given point in time, we denote by L k;i the mass of inputs of factor k employed in country i. Note that in the presence of idle inputs (e.g. labor unemployment), L k;i can be strictly less than the total supply of factor k in country i. Let L k;in (j) denote the mass of inputs of factor k in country i that are employed in supplying destination market n in sector j. The mass of inputs of factor k used in country i in sector j is
, and the sum of L k;i (j) across industries must equal total employment of factor k,
is an accounting variable describing how factor usage is distributed across destination markets. Below we discuss how L k;in (j) can be constructed in a range of speci…c models. In some cases it may not be straightforward to allocate sectoral employment,
As discussed in detail below, this can be the case, for example, if …rms must incur …xed costs that do not depend on the set of destination markets they supply (or if marginal costs are not constant). We show, however, that in some of these cases we do not need to construct L k;in (j) to apply our results that follow.
We denote by E i (j) 0 country i's total expenditure on sector j, and by in (j) 2 [0; 1] the share of country n's total expenditure in sector j that is allocated to goods from country i, with P i in (j) = 1. Then total revenues by producers in country i are
Factor payments: Let w k;in (j) denote the equilibrium average price paid in country i to inputs in factor group k employed in sector j in the production of goods bound for country n. This average price is equal to total earnings of these inputs divided by the mass of these inputs L k;in (j). The average price paid in country i to inputs in factor group k employed in sector j can then be expressed as
Similarly, the average price paid in country i to inputs in factor group k, w k;i , can be expressed as
Note that we do not impose the restriction that two identical inputs within a factor set (e.g. two identical workers) are paid the same price within or across plants, …rms, or sectors. Denote by in (j) the share of country i revenues from sales in country n in sector j that is paid to all factors,
Denote by k;in (j) the share of factor payments that are paid to inputs in factor set k,
, where P k k;in (j) = 1 for all n and j. If in (j) < 1, then any remaining revenues are pro…ts or rents paid to an input that is not included in any set k = 1; :::; K. Given these de…nitions, it follows that
Equation (1) states that the total earnings of employed inputs within a factor set must equal the payments to these inputs in the production of goods bound for all destination markets and across all sectors.
Factor content of trade: Denote by F CT k;i the factor content of trade for factor k in country i, de…ned as
To better understand the de…nition of the FCT, we use our de…nitions of in (j) and k;in (j) to express the payments for the FCT, w k;i F CT k;i , as
The …rst term in the summation in equation (2), k;in (j) in (j) in (j) E n (j), represents the payments to factor k embodied in country i's exports to destination market n. The second term in the summation, k;ii (j) ii (j) ni (j) E i (j), represents the counterfactual payments to factor k in country i, had country i produced for itself the value of goods that it imported from country n. Therefore, the FCT corresponds to the net exports of factor k embodied in country i's trade. Note that constructing the FCT in the data requires input usage and average factor prices by destination country, which may be di¢ cult to observe in practice. In Section 2.2, we discuss a range of models in which the construction of F CT k;i is simpli…ed signi…cantly.
Factor prices: To show how F CT k;i is related to w k;i , we proceed as follows. By equations (1) and (2), and using ii (j) = 1 P n6 =i ni (j), we decompose payments to factor k into two components:
The …rst component is the payments for the FCT de…ned in equation (2). The second component is the factor payments for domestic absorption (FPD),
which is the counterfactual payments to factor k if domestic absorption were produced domestically. By equation (3), factor k's average price is
where
denotes the trade-adjusted supply of factor k.
6 By comparing equations (1) and (4), it is apparent that for given values of ii (j), k;ii (j), and E i (j), the average price paid to factor k in a trade equilibrium is equal to the average price that would have been paid to factor k in autarky had country i's employment of factor k been L k;i rather than L k;i . If a country is a net exporter of factor k, then its average factor price is determined as if it has a smaller stock of this factor. In this sense, we can think of L k;i as the counterfactual employment of factor k available in economy i in the presence of international trade.
Using equation (4), we express the average price of factor k 1 relative to factor k 2 as
for any k 1 ; k 2 K. Equation (5) decomposes the relative price of factor k 1 to factor k 2 into two terms: (i) the trade-adjusted employment of k 2 relative to k 1 and (ii) the FPD of k 1 relative to k 2 . An increase in L k 2 ;i /L k 1 ;i , either through a decrease in the relative employment of factor k 1 or an increase in the FCT of k 1 , increases the relative average price of k 1 . Similarly, an increase in k 1 ;i / k 2 ;i , either through an increase in expenditure shares in sectors intensive in factor k 1 or an increase in the average revenue share of factor k 1 across sectors, increases the relative price of k 1 .
We summarize these results in the following proposition, which provides an equation for the change in the relative price of factor k 1 to factor k 2 between any two equilibria.
k;i , and 0 k;i denote the relative average price of factor k 1 to factor k 2 , the trade-adjusted supply of factor k, and the factor payments for domestic absorption of factor k in a counterfactual equilibrium, then
Of course, both L k;i and k;i are endogenous, and their equilibrium determination-and therefore, how they are a¤ected by trade liberalization-is outside the scope of this accounting framework. In Section 3, we specialize our general framework to study the determination of these variables.
Mapping Speci…c Models into Framework
In this section we discuss how a variety of models of international trade, technological change, and relative factor prices can be mapped into the general framework above. We also describe a range of model assumptions under which expression (6) and the calculation of the FCT can be simpli…ed signi…cantly. In the examples we consider, we follow the literature and assume that all inputs within a factor set are homogeneous. Moreover, because the labor market is perfectly competitive in the examples below, all inputs within a factor set receive a common price, w k;i .
Heckscher-Ohlin-like perfectly competitive models: Here we focus on perfectly competitive models with constant returns to scale in which all producers within a sector share a common factor intensity that does not depend on the destination in which output is sold. These assumptions are satis…ed in the Heckscher-Ohlin model-see, e.g., Stolper and Samuelson (1941) -and its multi-sector and multi-factor extensions-see, e.g., Ethier (1984) , Jones and Scheinkman (1977) , and Costinot and Vogel (2010) .
In these models, L k;in (j) can be constructed easily, as the product of sector j's employment of factor k, L k;i (j), and the ratio of country i sector j revenues earned in market n to total revenues earned in that sector, in (j) E n (j) = ( P n 0 in 0 (j) E n 0 (j)). Hence, the share of factor payments accruing to factor k in sector j production-i.e. the factor k intensity of production in sector j-is the same across destination markets, k;in (j) = k;i (j) for all i, n, k, and j, where
. (7) in (j) = 1 for all i, n, and j. In any setting in which k;in (j) and in (j) are common across destination markets, we can simplify signi…cantly the construction of net exports of factor k. In particular, we have
n in (j) E n (j) denotes the ratio of country i's net exports in sector j to country i's total revenue in sector j. The variables L k;i (j) and ! i (j), and hence the factor k content of trade, can be measured in principle using sectoral production and trade data.
In this environment, the expression in Proposition 1 is simpli…ed only because k;in (j) = k;i (j) and in (j) = 1. However, we can further simplify this expression under a few additional assumptions. If preferences and production functions are Cobb-Douglas and the Cobb-Douglas share parameters are unchanged across equilibria, then equation (6) simpli…es to w
In this special case, relative factor prices change only due to changes in trade-adjusted factor supplies. For …xed domestic supplies of factors k 1 and k 2 , any change in the economic environment-such as trade costs, foreign productivities, foreign factor supplies, foreign production functions, domestic productivities, or domestic supplies of factors other than k 1 and k 2 -a¤ects domestic relative factor prices only through changes in the FCT. Expression (9) was also obtained in Deardor¤ and Staiger (1988) and Deardor¤ (2000) in a perfectly competitive environment with constant returns to scale and common productivities across producers within each sector. Our result allows for heterogeneous productivities within sectors, as in a multi-sector and multi-factor version of Eaton and Kortum (2002). 7 Common factor intensities across sectors: A particular class of models nested by the perfectly competitive, constant returns to scale models above are those in which factor intensity is identical across producers, sectors, and destination markets, k;in (j) = k;i . These assumptions are satis…ed in, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992) , Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rul, and Violante (2000) , and Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2010) . Under these assumptions, equation (5) simpli…es to
Moreover, because F CT k;i equals k;i =w k;i times country i's net aggregate exports (i's trade balance), we have
In this class of models, changes in relative factor prices across two points in time are driven entirely by changes in relative factor supplies and by changes in relative factor intensities. Factor intensity varies by destination market: In Matsuyama (2007) and Burstein and Vogel (2010) , markets are perfectly competitive, production is constant returns to scale, and average factor intensities vary depending on destination market. In Matsuyama (2007) producers are homogeneous within a sector, and trade costs are assumed to be skill intensive relative to production. In Burstein and Vogel (2010) , for a given producer, skill intensity is independent of destination market, but the most productive producers tend to export and to be more skill intensive. Hence in these models, i (j) = 1 but k;in (j) tends not to equal
With constant returns to scale it is straightforward to allocate aggregate sectoral factor employment, L k;i (j), to each destination market, L k;in (j). Hence, these models …t into the general framework presented above. However, equation (6) simpli…es only because ii (j) = 1. In general, changes in trade costs will a¤ect relative factor prices through both trade-adjusted factor supplies and the factor payments for domestic absorption.
Heckscher-Ohlin-like imperfectly competitive models: In Section 3 we consider a range of models featuring imperfect competition, heterogeneous …rms, and increasing returns to scale, as in, e.g., Romalis (2004) and BRS (2007) . With imperfect competition, …rms may earn pro…ts, so in (j) is not generally equal to one. Moreover, in some cases it is not straightforward to allocate sectoral employment, L k;i (j), across destination markets, L k;in (j). This can be the case, for example, if a …rm must incur …xed costs that do not depend on the set of destination markets it supplies. However, we show that in the model of Section 3, Proposition 1 holds with the FCT being constructed using equation (8), and that equation (6) simpli…es to equation (9).
It is straightforward to show that the same results hold in a two-factor version of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) , which is an extension of Eaton and Kortum (2002) with Bertrand instead of perfect competition. Since there are constant returns to scale (and no …xed costs), allocating factors across destination markets is straightforward. With Frechet distributed productivities and CES demand, in (j) is constant and equal across destination markets.
this environment, Proposition 1 holds, the FCT is given by equation (8), and the calculation of the FCT in equation (6) simpli…es to equation (9). Second, in Section 4, we demonstrate that the FCT and factor endowments fully determine not only the relative price of skilled to unskilled labor (the skill premium), but also the extent of between-sector factor reallocation and between-sector trade. Finally, in Section 5, we show how the extent of productivity heterogeneity between and within sectors, and heterogeneous …rms'decisions to enter and operate in each market shape the impact of trade liberalization on the FCT, and, therefore, on factor allocation and the skill premium.
Model
Our model economy features two countries, i = 1; 2; two factors, which we refer to as skilled labor and unskilled labor; and two sectors, j = x; y, where x is skill intensive.
11 Here we assume, without loss of generality for our results, that within each factor, all inputs are homogeneous. While factors are perfectly mobile across producers within a country, they are internationally immobile. The exogenous and …xed endowments of skilled and unskilled labor in country i are denoted by L s;i and L u;i , respectively. Each country produces a …nal non-tradeable good using output of both sectors. Output in each sector is produced using a continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods, which are produced by …rms using skilled and unskilled labor. To focus on cases in which changes in the FCT fully determine the impact of trade on factor prices, we assume that intermediate goods production functions and the …nal non-tradeable good aggregator are Cobb Douglas. International trade of intermediate goods is subject to variable and …xed costs. Factors are perfectly mobile across …rms and sectors but are immobile across countries.
Preferences:
The representative consumer's utility is de…ned over a non-tradeable …nal good, Q i , that (for expositional purposes) places equal weight on the output of each sector
where Q i (j) denotes the output of sector j. The aggregate price index is
where P i (j) is the price of sector j. Demand for the sector j good is
, where E i = Q i P i denotes total expenditure in country i. 11 We impose that there are two countries and two sectors for analytic tractability. We believe that the intuition for our results extend to more general environments. For an analysis of Stolper-Samuelson-like results in environments with many factors and sectors, see Costinot and Vogel (2010) .
Sectoral aggregates: Sector j's output, Q i (j), is a CES aggregate of varieties
Here, q i (!; j) denotes country i consumption of variety (!; j), and > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The price index in sector j is
, where p i (!; j) denotes the price of good (!; j) in country i. Demand for variety (!; j) is
Intermediate good technologies: There are a continuum of …rms, each producing a unique variety (!; j). Firms face variable costs of production, …xed (market access) costs of selling in each country, and iceberg costs of international trade. Both …xed and variable costs use skilled and unskilled labor, where the factor intensity of production varies across sectors but is constant across …rms within a sector and across …xed and variable costs within a …rm.
A sector j …rm from country i with Hicks-neutral productivity z 1 that hires l s units of skilled labor and l u units of unskilled labor in variable production activities produces y =
units of output, where s (j) + u (j) = 1. Here, k (j) denotes the share of skilled (k = s) and unskilled (k = u) labor in production of all country i …rms in sector j, where we omit the dependence of k (j) on i since factor intensities are equal in both countries. Because x is skill intensive, we have s (x) > s (y). A i (j) > 0 denotes country i's exogenous total factor productivity in sector j.
To facilitate exposition in our results below, we decompose A i (j) into two componentsnational TFP, T i , and sectoral TFP,
Firms from country i must ship in q units of output in order for q units to arrive in country n, with ii = 1 and in = ni = 1. We refer to as the iceberg transportation cost. Additionally, in order to supply a positive amount of goods to country n, a country i …rm incurs a …xed market access cost of f in 0 units of the sectoral composite input bundle in country i; we assume that these …xed costs are produced using the same input bundle as the production of intermediate goods in that sector. For simplicity, but without loss of generality for our results, we assume that variable and …xed trade costs are common across sectors. We denote by f = f 12 =f 11 = f 21 =f 22 the relative …xed costs of international versus intra-national trade in all sectors and countries.
Under these assumptions on technology, a sector j …rm with productivity z from country i incurs a cost
to supply q > 0 units of goods to country n. We refer to v i (j) as the cost of the sector j composite input bundle in country i, where
and where country i's wages for unskilled and skilled labor are w s;i and w u;i , respectively. We denote by c in (z; j) = v i (j) in =z the marginal cost of a …rm with productivity z, sector j, in country i to supply a good to country n. Conditional on a country i …rm paying the …xed cost to access market n, pro…t maximization implies that it charges a constant markup over its marginal cost, p in (z; j) = 1 c in (z; j). In this case, a …rm's market-speci…c revenue is proportional to its marginal cost,
and its market-speci…c variable pro…t is proportional to its revenue in (z; j) = r in (z; j) = .
Selection of …rms into markets: A country i …rm chooses to supply market n if the variable pro…t it earns there covers its …xed market access cost, in (z; j) v i (j) f in (j). Denote by z in (j) the productivity threshold at which the least productive sector j …rm from country i sells in country n:
In order to understand the implications of endogenous selection for trade patterns and relative factor rewards, we consider speci…cations in which endogenous selection into markets is and is not active. In the speci…cation in which endogenous selection is not active, we assume that f in = 0 for all i; n 2 I, so that every entrant sells to each market: z in (j) = 1 for all i; n 2 I and j 2 J.
12 We refer to this as the case "without selection." This case corresponds to a multi-factor extension of Krugman (1980) , as in Helpman and Krugman (1985) and in Romalis (2004). In the speci…cation in which endogenous selection is active, we assume that f in is suf…ciently large for all i; n 2 I and j 2 J such that there is selection into every market, i.e. z in (j) > 1 for al i; n 2 I and j 2 J. We refer to this as the case "with selection." This case corresponds to a multi-factor extension of Melitz (2003 )-as in BRS-or of Chaney (2008 . Note that the two cases we consider are not exhaustive. There are parameter values for which there exist country-pairs and sectors such that z in (j) = 1 and z kl (j 0 ) > 1.
Entry: In order to understand the implications of endogenous entry for trade patterns and relative factor prices, we consider two alternative speci…cations on the determination of the mass of entering …rms in each sector, M i (j); we refer to these speci…cations as exogenous and endogenous entry. The di¤erence between the two speci…cations is the timing regarding when entrepreneurs (potential entrants) realize their productivities.
In the speci…cation with exogenous entry, we assume that entrepreneurs know their productivities ex-ante. In this case, the mass of entrepreneurs is …xed at M i (j)-since if it were unbounded then only the most productive would enter-but the number of operating …rms in each sector is endogenous because …rms must pay a …xed cost to sell in each market. Firms in each sector/country draw their productivity z from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter and location parameter one: G (z) = Pr (Z z) = 1 z . This case corresponds to, e.g., Chaney (2008), Arkolakis (Forthcoming), and Eaton et. al. (Forthcoming) . For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume in the exogenous entry case that M i (j) = M i .
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In the speci…cation with endogenous entry, we assume that entrepreneurs are identical ex-ante. In this case, in each country/sector there is an unbounded mass of ex-ante identical potential entrants. To enter, an entrepreneur incurs a …xed entry cost of f e > 0 units of the sectoral composite input bundle (in the exogenous entry case, we assume that f e = 0 for all j). That is, sector j startup costs in country i are f e v i (j). Upon entry, …rms draw their productivity z from the same distribution G (z) de…ned above and subsequently chose whether or not to pay a …xed cost to sell in each market. This case corresponds to a version of Melitz (2003) and BRS (2007) with Pareto distributed productivities. The free entry condition, for all j, is given by
Finally, in all that follows we focus exclusively on cases with incomplete specialization; i.e. in which M i (j) > 0 for all i 2 I and j 2 J.
Trade balance: We assume trade balance in both countries. This implies that total expen-diture equals total income (wages and pro…ts) in each country,
Equilibrium Characterization
In this section we derive the equations that we use to solve for equilibrium factor prices and trade patterns. We consider speci…cations (i) with endogenous or exogenous entry and (ii) with or without selection.
International trade: Denote by in (j) the sector j expenditure share in country n on goods from country i. By de…nition, we have
Substituting in for G (z) and r in (z; j) yields
In the speci…cation without selection, in which z in (j) = 1 for all i; n 2 I and j 2 J, Equation
In the speci…cation with selection, in which z in (j) > 1 for al i; n 2 I and j 2 J, Equation
We de…ne t to be the relative size of international versus intra-national trade costs,
with selection.
It is apparent from inspection of equations (14) and (15) that it is this relative cost t that matters, rather than and f separately. We assume that relative costs of international trade are strictly greater than those of intra-national trade, so that t > 1.
We denote by i = 1 2
[ ni (x) + ni (y)], for n 6 = i, country i's trade share. Note that i is the share of country i's expenditure allocated to imports from country n 6 = i. We also denote by i = ni (y)
ni (x), for n 6 = i, the share of country i's expenditure allocated to imports in sector y minus the share of expenditures allocated to imports in sector x. The greater in absolute value is i , the greater is the di¤erence between net imports in the x and y sectors. Hence, for a given trade share i , i indicates the importance of between sector trade relative to within sector trade.
Labor market clearing:
In Appendix A we show that the labor market clearing conditionswhen entry is endogenous or exogenous and with or without selection-are given by
where is the share of revenues paid to all factors in both sectors,
and is given by 
in the di¤erent speci…cations of the model.
Equilibrium …rm entry:
In Appendix A we show that with endogenous entry, the mass of entering …rms in each sector is given by
where e = 1= without selection and e = ( 1) = ( ) with selection.
Solving for an equilibrium: Equilibrium factor prices, total expenditures E i , expenditure shares in (j), and entrants M i (j) can be solved for using factor market clearing as given by equation (16) (note that, by Walras' law, one equation is redundant), equation (17), expenditure shares in (j) as given by Equation (14) without selection and by Equation (15) with selection, and the free-entry conditions (with endogenous entry) as given by Equation
. 14 14 After solving for an equilibrium assuming that the model is either with selection or without selection,
We compute production and consumption of the …nal non-tradeable good, Q i , as follows. Given factor prices, nominal expenditures, and entry levels, the solution for sectoral price indices is provided in Appendix B. Using sectoral price indices and the de…nition of the aggregate price level, P i , above we obtain Q i . Our model and this solution procedure can be extended to any number of factors, sectors, and countries.
In some comparative static exercises, in Section 5, we simplify the model solution by assuming that countries and sectors are mirror symmetric:
, and x = 1 y . Mirror symmetry makes the model more tractable because w s1 = w u2 , w u1 = w s2 , and E 1 = E 2 .
Mapping to General Framework
The model clearly …ts into the general framework presented in Section 2. In the speci…cation with exogenous entry, constructing L k;in (j) is straightforward. It is the sum of factor k employment in variable production and market access costs for supplying destination market n. With CES sectoral aggregators, the share of variable costs in total sectoral revenue is constant. With CES sectoral aggregators and Pareto-distributed productivity, the share of market access costs in total sectoral revenue is also constant. Hence, with common and across sectors and countries, in (j) = for all destination markets and in each sector, where = ( + 1) = ( ) with selection and = ( 1) = without selection. Since factor intensity is common across …xed and variable costs as well as across source and destination markets, we have k;in (j) = k (j). Hence, equation (1) from the general framework of Section 2 is simpli…ed to equation (16) in our specialized model.
In the speci…cation with endogenous entry, constructing L k;in (j) is more subtle because there are multiple ways of allocating entry costs, f e , across destination markets. However, in this speci…cation we do not need to construct L k;in (j) to use the results in Section 2. This is because for any construction of L k;in (j) consistent with equilibrium sectoral factor allocation (i.e., L k;i (j) = P n L k;in (j)), we can simplify equations (1) from the general framework of Section 2 to equation (16) in our model. To obtain equation (16), we make use of two results:
(i) free entry implies that revenues are equal to total costs (including entry, market access, and variable costs) in each sector, and (ii) …xed and variable costs have a common factor intensity in each sector. Note that to obtain this result in the speci…cation with endogenous entry, we do not make use of Pareto distributed productivity or CES aggregators.
Given that factor market clearing conditions are given by equation (16), it follows that we can express the FCT using equation (8) in all speci…cations of our model. Finally, one must verify that all cuto¤s are either greater than one or equal to one, respectively, using equation (12).
with Cobb-Douglas preferences and production functions and unchanged share parameters ( k (j) = 0 k (j)), equation (6) from the general framework simpli…es to equation (9), so that the change in the skill premium across two equilibria is given by
Hence, in all speci…cations of our model, changes in the skill premium are fully determined by changes in trade-adjusted factor supplies. Moreover, since we impose that factor supplies are …xed parameters (L k;i = L 0 k;i ), changes in the FCT are su¢ cient statistics for the impact of trade on the skill premium: changes in trade costs or in productivities a¤ect the skill premium only through changes in the FCT.
The Skill Premium, Factor Allocation, and Trade
We now investigate the impact of trade liberalizations on the skill premium, factor allocation, and trade patterns in our model. We …rst show that if country 1 has a comparative advantage in the skill intensive good, then the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill, L s;i =L u;i , falls in country 1 and rises in country 2 when countries open to trade. We then show that changes in L s;i =L u;i fully determine the impact of trade liberalization not only on the skill premium, as shown in the previous section, but also on between-sector factor allocation and betweensector trade. Through these results, we obtain a generalized version of what is often referred to as the Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect. The Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect relates changes in factor prices to exogenous changes in goods prices, whereas we relate changes in factor prices, factor allocation, and trade patterns to changes in trade costs, via changes in trade shares.
We say that country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector x if the cost of the composite input bundle in sector x relative to sector y is relatively lower in country 1 than in country 2 in autarky: v 1 (x) =v 1 (y) < v 2 (x) =v 2 (y) in autarky. According to this de…nition, country 1 has a comparative advantage in the skill-intensive sector if and only if
Condition CA follows from the de…nition of v i (j) in equation (10), from the factor-market clearing condition in equation (16), and from the observation that 12 (j) = 21 (j) = 0 in autarky. 
Country 1 is a net exporter in the sector in which it has a comparative advantage, sector
Because the x sector is skill intensive, country 1's net exports embody a positive amount of skilled labor, F CT s;1 > 0, and a negative amount of unskilled labor, F CT u;1 < 0, if 1 > 0. Hence, moving from autarky to any positive trade shares reduces the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill in country 1.
For given trade shares 1 and 2 , the level of the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill in either country, L s;i =L u;i , determines important economic outcomes in both countries: the skill premium w s;i =w u;i ; between-sector factor allocation L k;i (j); and between-sector trade (the absolute value of i ). The following proposition states speci…cally how these economic outcomes vary across two equilibria with equal trade shares but di¤erent trade-adjusted factor supplies. 
The broad intuition behind Proposition 3 can be understood as follows. A lower tradeadjusted relative supply of skill in country 1 (statement i) increases the skill premium in country 1 (statement iii), as stated in Proposition 1. For …xed factor supplies, a lower trade-adjusted relative supply of skill requires a higher absolute value of the FCT of skilled and unskilled labor in country 1, which requires that the extent of between-sector trade be greater (statement vii, since 1 > 0 from Condition CA). More between-sector trade requires that a greater share of factors be allocated to country 1's comparative advantage sector (statement v). With trade balance and …xed trade shares, more between-sector trade in country 1 (statement vii) requires more between-sector trade in country 2 (statement viii, since 2 < 0), a greater share of factors allocated to country 2's CA sector (statement vi), and a greater absolute value of the FCT of skilled and unskilled labor, which is associated with both a higher trade-adjusted relative supply of skill (statement ii) and a lower skill premium (statement iv).
Combining Propositions 2 and 3, we establish the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Reducing trade costs so that countries move from autarky ( 1 ; 2 = 0) to any positive level of trade ( 0 1 ; 0 2 > 0) raises the skill premium in country 1 and reduces it in country 2, reallocates factors towards the x sector in country 1 and towards the y sector in country 2, and generates positive net exports in the x sector in country 1 and in the y sector in country 2.
Intuitively, starting in autarky, a reduction in trade costs increases each country's net exports in its comparative advantage sector. This requires factors to reallocate towards that sector, which increases the relative demand and, therefore, the relative price of the factor that is used intensively in the comparative advantage sector.
Technology, Selection, and Entry
Changes in the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill are determined by changes in the FCT, which are endogenous. Our next goal is to study how key margins in our model-the extent of productivity heterogeneity between and within sectors, and heterogeneous …rms'decisions to enter and operate in each market-shape the impact of trade liberalization on the FCT, and, therefore, on factor allocation and the skill premium.
These margins matter for equilibrium outcomes only through their impacts on expenditure shares in (j). This follows from Proposition 3, which shows that for given factor supplies and trade shares, changes in trade-adjusted relative factor supplies in each country are fully determined by changes in the extent of between-sector trade 1 , which is itself determined by changes in in (j). Equation (13) illustrates the various exogenous and endogenous determinants of these expenditure shares. First, composite input costs, v i (j), have a direct e¤ect on expenditure shares through the prices charged by active …rms. All else equal, lowering v i (j) increases in (j) for all n. From equation (10), composite input costs can be decomposed into two components: (i) factor prices and intensities, w k (j) k;i , as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and (ii) exogenous sectoral technologies, A i (j), as in the Ricardian model. Second, the mass of operating …rms from each country shapes expenditure shares: an increase in the mass of country i …rms operating in country n increases in (j), all else equal. This mass of …rms can be decomposed into two components: (i) the mass of entering …rms in country i, given by M i (j), and (ii) the fraction of country i entrants that operate in country n, which is negatively related to z in (j). All else equal, an increase in the mass of operating …rms, either through an increase in M i (j) or a decrease in z in (j), is equivalent, in terms of expenditure shares, to an increase in sectoral productivity A i (j).
Third, the extent of productivity heterogeneity a¤ects the elasticity of expenditure shares to a change in the productivity cuto¤, z in (j). In particular, a greater dispersion of productivity, a lower , decreases the concentration of …rms around the cuto¤. This implies a smaller decrease in the mass of operating …rms for a given increase in the productivity cuto¤.
In what follows, we study how each of these margins a¤ects the impact of trade liberalization on trade-adjusted relative supplies of skill, and therefore on the skill premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and trade. In order to isolate the e¤ects of these margins in our comparative static exercises, we choose trade costs, t, and relative country productivities, T 1 =T 2 , so that trade shares, 1 and 2 , remain …xed.
15 When comparing across equilibria under di¤erent parameter values, we always impose that factor supplies, factor shares, and the elasticity of substitution between varieties within sectors remain …xed:
, and = 0 .
Productivity heterogeneity
Proposition 4 summarizes our …ndings about how productivity heterogeneity a¤ects the impact of trade liberalization on trade-adjusted relative supplies of skill, and therefore on the skill premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and trade.
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Proposition 4 In the speci…cation of the model with selection, the decline in the tradeadjusted relative supply of skill in country 1 caused by moving from autarky to trade shares Consider …rst the intuition for Proposition 4 in the exogenous entry case. Increasing a (i.e., increasing country 1's relative productivity advantage in sector x) reduces country 1's cost in the x sector relative to its cost in the y sector, relative to that in country 2. These changes in relative costs reinforce country 1's comparative advantage in sector x, inducing country 1 to specialize further in sector x. Hence, L s;1 =L u;1 falls because the x sector is skill intensive.
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Consider second the role of in the exogenous entry case. As discussed above, the elasticity of in (j) to a change in the cuto¤ productivity z in (j) is increasing in . To understand how this elasticity matters for economic outcomes, consider a change in v i (j), the composite input cost in sector j. The direct e¤ect of such a change on z in (j) is independent of . However, a given change in z in (j) has a larger e¤ect on sectoral expenditures the less dispersed are productivities, i.e., the higher is . Hence, higher values of increase the responsiveness of expenditure shares to a change in the cost of the composite input bundle. This implies that factor endowment di¤erences and sectoral productivity di¤erences, which a¤ect the relative cost of the composite input bundle across countries, play a larger role in shaping expenditure shares, and therefore trade-adjusted relative supplies of skill, when is larger.
In the endogenous entry case, changes in a and have indirect e¤ects on expenditure shares through M i (j), in addition to the direct e¤ects we discuss above in the exogenous entry case. An increase in a increases relative entry in the x sector in country 1 relative to country 2, which reinforces the direct e¤ect. That is, endogenous entry magni…es exogenous comparative advantage. To understand the impact of an increase in on entry, consider the following thought experiment: Starting in autarky, consider a move to trade …rst holding both z in (j) and M i (j) …xed. International trade increases market-speci…c relative pro…ts in a country's comparative advantage sector. Note that the impact on pro…ts does not depend directly on for a …xed z in (j). Allowing now for changes in z in (j) while still holding entry …xed, the previous discussion implies that changes in z in (j) are also independent of . However, the less dispersed are productivities (i.e. the greater is ), the greater is the change in a potential entrant's expected market-speci…c pro…t given equal-sized changes in z in (j). Hence, given M i (j), opening up to trade induces larger changes in the expected value of …rms at entry, the higher is . Hence, we should anticipate a rise in relative entry in the comparative advantage sector, and this rise should be greater the higher is . Thus, the indirect e¤ect of a change in on entry reinforces the direct e¤ect of .
While Proposition 4 focuses on the speci…cation of the model with selection, we obtain similar results in the speci…cation without selection. In this speci…cation, the parameter a has the same e¤ect as in Proposition 4. On the other hand, since the partial elasticity of expenditure shares with respect to composite input costs is 1 instead of ( + 1 ) = (1 ), in this case Proposition 4 holds when is replaced by . Without selection, within-sector productivity heterogeneity does not matter for the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill.
Entry
Proposition 5 summarizes our …ndings about how the extent of endogenous entry a¤ects the impact of trade liberalization on trade-adjusted relative supplies of skill, and therefore on the skill premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and trade.
Proposition 5 The decline in the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill in country 1 caused by moving from autarky to trade shares 1 ; 2 > 0 is greater in the speci…cation with endogenous entry than in the speci…cation with exogenous entry.
In the speci…cation with endogenous entry, trade liberalization increases entry in a country's comparative advantage sector relative to its comparative disadvantage sector. Recall that a larger mass of entrants in a given sector is equivalent-in terms of its implications for the skill premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and tradeto an increase in that sector's exogenous Ricardian productivity. Hence, endogenous entry decreases L s;1 =L u;1 , just as an increase in exogenous Ricardian comparative advantage a.
Selection
Proposition 6 summarizes our …ndings about how the extent of selection a¤ects the impact of trade liberalization on trade-adjusted relative supplies of skill, and therefore on the skill premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and trade.
Proposition 6 The decline in the trade-adjusted relative supply of skill in country 1 caused by moving from autarky to trade shares 1 ; 2 > 0, is greater in the speci…cation with selection than in the speci…cation without selection if either (i) entry is exogenous, or (ii) entry is endogenous and countries and sectors are mirror symmetric.
This result follows directly from the following two observations; hence, we omit a formal proof of this proposition. First, trade patterns and factor prices obtained using the equations in the speci…cation with selection limit to those obtained using the equations in the speci…cation without selection, as converges to 1, when all parameters are the same across speci…cations (obviously with the exception of market access costs, which are assumed to be zero without selection). This is because, as converges to 1, almost all production occurs within an arbitrarily small mass of very productive …rms. Hence, in this limiting case L s;1 =L u;1 is equivalent in the speci…cation with selection and the speci…cation without selection. Second, in the speci…cation with selection, the decline in L s;1 =L u;1 (holding trade shares …xed) is greater the higher is , as shown in Proposition 4.
Intuitively, with endogenous selection the fraction of country 1 entrants, relative to country 2 entrants, that choose to sell in any given market is relatively larger in country 1's comparative advantage sector because country 1 has a relatively lower composite input cost in this sector:
Recall that a larger fraction of …rms that supply a given market is equivalent-in terms of its implications for the skill premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and trade-to a larger exogenous sectoral productivity. Hence, endogenous selection reinforces ex-ante comparative advantage. Note that when a = 1 this implies that the average productivity of country 1 …rms supplying a given country is relatively lower in county 1's comparative advantage sector, relative to country 2.
Relation of Proposition 6 to BRS: Proposition 6 and Condition (20) are reminiscent of a result in BRS that, with selection and endogenous entry, di¤erences in endowments across countries lead to stronger selection for domestic production in a country's comparative advantage sector:
That is, endogenous selection implies that the average productivity of …rms that choose to produce for the domestic market is relatively greater in country 1's comparative advantage sector, compared to country 2. This leads to their interpretation that di¤erences in endowments across countries induce what they call "endogenous Ricardian productivity di¤erences" at the industry level, which magnify Heckscher-Ohlin-based comparative advantage. This interpretation may appear similar to our result in Proposition 6, but it is not. BRS do not show what implications, if any, Condition (21) has for the skill premium or for the extent of either between-sector factor reallocation or trade. Moreover, Condition (20), which plays a central role in Proposition 6, di¤ers from Condition (21) in three important respects. First, Condition (20) depends on a comparison of 18 With endogenous entry, the relative mass of entrants also plays a role in this result. cuto¤s in a common destination market, whereas Condition (21) depends on a comparison of cuto¤s in each country's domestic market. Second, Condition (20) emphasizes that a country is less selective in any given destination in its comparative advantage sector, relative to the other country, whereas Condition (21) emphasizes that a country is more selective in its domestic market in its comparative advantage sector, relative to the other country. Third, while Condition (20) is satis…ed with either endogenous or exogenous entry, Condition (21) is reversed in the speci…cation with exogenous entry. That is, while endogenous selection magni…es the e¤ect of trade on the skill premium and the extent of both between-sector factor reallocation and trade in both the speci…cation with endogenous entry and the speci…cation without, Condition (21) holds in one speci…cation but is reversed in the other. The following Proposition shows that whether the average productivity of domestic …rms is relatively higher or lower in a country's comparative advantage sector compared to another country depends on whether entry is endogenous or exogenous.
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Proposition 7 Consider the speci…cation of our model with selection and suppose that A i (j) = 1 and, if entry is exogenous, that M i (j) = 1. If entry is endogenous and trade shares are positive, then z 11 (x) =z 11 (y) > z 22 (x) =z 22 (y). If entry is exogenous and there is no factor price equalization, then z 11 (x) =z 11 (y) < z 22 (x) =z 22 (y).
Why does the relationship between the average productivity of domestic …rms across sectors depend on whether entry is endogenous or exogenous? In our model, countries specialize in their comparative advantage sector. Recall from equation (13) that an expansion of the comparative advantage sector can occur along three margins: (i) …rms of equal productivity can be larger, (ii) the productivity cuto¤ can be lower, and (iii) entry can be greater. With exogenous entry, only margins (i) and (ii) are active. Equally productive …rms are larger in the comparative advantage sector and, in order to have a larger mass of operating …rms, the comparative advantage sector must be relatively less selective. With endogenous entry, all three margins are active. Moreover, margins (ii) and (iii) are not independent. When entry is endogenous, a relatively higher entry level in the comparative advantage sector makes survival relatively more di¢ cult in the domestic market. Hence, this sector is larger while also being more selective. 20 19 In Lemma 7, we impose M i (j) = 1 with exogenous entry and A i (j) = 1 so that factor endowment di¤erences are the unique source of exogenous comparative advantage, as in BRS. 20 Another result in BRS-that the export cuto¤ relative to the domestic cuto¤ is relatively lower in each country's comparative advantage sector, e.g. z 12 (x) =z 11 (x) < z 12 (y) =z 11 (y)-holds both with endogenous entry (as considered in BRS) and exogenous entry.
Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a unifying framework to study how factor prices and factor allocation respond to trade liberalizations. We derived a simple expression relating equilibrium factor prices to two components: trade-adjusted factor supplies and relative factor payments for domestic absorption. We showed how changes in relative factor prices within a range of workhorse models of trade can be mapped into these two components and described a set of standard assumptions under which changes in the FCT are su¢ cient statistics for the impact of trade on relative factor prices.
We then specialized the general framework to an environment that combines the key elements of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the Ricardian model, and the Melitz model. Changes in the FCT fully determine not only relative factor prices, but also the extent of betweensector factor reallocation and between-sector trade. We used this model to examine how the FCT is shaped by heterogenous …rms'decisions to enter and to operate in each market. Endogenous entry and endogenous selection of …rms into markets magnify the impact of trade on the FCT and hence the change in the skill premium and the extent of betweensector trade and factor reallocation, while greater within-sector productivity heterogeneity weakens these e¤ects. Given the extensive evidence of large productivity di¤erences within narrowly-de…ned sectors, our prediction about the implications of within-sector productivity heterogeneity provides a rationale for empirical results suggesting that the FCT, the extent of between-sector factor reallocation induced by trade, and the impact of trade on the skill premium are small in practice.
Appendix A: Additional Derivations

Labor Market Clearing with Exogenous Entry
Variable input costs: With Cobb-Douglas production functions, payments to skilled and unskilled labor hired as a variable input in the production of a variety of sector j in country i that is bound for country n, denoted by l s;in (z; j) and l u in (z; j), are proportional to market-speci…c revenues
Equation (22) implies that total payments to country i labor employed in variable production in sector j are 1 2 P n 1 in (j) E n , of which a share k (j) is paid to factor k.
Market access input costs: Country i's total market access …xed costs associated with selling sector j goods in country n are given by
Equation (11) implies that total sector j revenue in country i from goods shipped to country n is
In the case with no selection F in (j) = 0. In the case with selection
of which a share k (j) is paid to factor k.
Total factor payments without selection: With no selection into any market, variable labor costs represent a share ( 1) = of total revenues and market access payments are zero. Therefore, total labor payments equal
In the exogenous entry case, Equation (24) and balanced trade imply E n = 1 (w s;n L s;n + w u;n L u;n ).
Hence, equation (24) is equivalent to equation (16), where = ( 1) = .
Total factor payments with selection: Total payments to sector j labor in country i are the sum of variable input payments and market access …xed cost payments. With selection, these payments
in (j) E n , of which a share k (j) is paid to factor k. Hence, factor market clearing implies
Equation (25) and balanced trade imply E n = +1 (w s;n L s;n + w u;n L u;n ). Hence, equation ( 
Labor Market Clearing and Entry with Endogenous Entry
Labor market clearing: With free entry, total revenue equals total factor payments, sector by
Moreover, the share of factor payments that accrue to factor k is k (j) in sector j,
By summing equation (26) across sectors, we obtain equation (16), where = 1.
Entry: Total entry costs in sector j are M i (j) v i (j) f e . From the free entry condition, total entry costs, M i (j) v i (j) f e , are equal to total revenues, P n in (j) En 2 , minus variable production costs, P n 1 in (j) En 2 , and market access costs, F in (j). Together with F in (j) = 0, without selection, and with equation (23), with selection, we obtain equation (19) both with and without selection.
Price Indices
The sector j price level in country n equals
Without selection Equation (27) is equivalent to
where 2 = +1 1
1
. With selection, Equation (27) is equivalent to
With exogenous entry,
M 2 (y) = 1. 21 With endogenous entry, equation (19) implies
where = 0 with exogenous entry and = 1 with endogenous entry. In autarky, Inequality (30) is violated, since the left-hand-side is strictly greater than one under Condition CA and since = 1 simply because ii (j) = 1 and in (j) = 0 for all i 6 = n. Note that for arbitrarily small trade shares, Inequality (30) remains violated because and
v 2 (y)v 1 (x) depend on trade costs only through the in (j)'s, are continuous in the in (j)'s, and for arbitrarily small trade shares ii (j) and in (j) are arbitrarily close to their autarky values.
Since both the left-and right-hand sides of Inequality (30) are continuous in the in (j)'s, a necessary condition for Inequality (30) to be satis…ed is that there exist trade costs such that 1 ; 2 > 0 and Inequality (30) is satis…ed with equality; i.e. 21 (y) = 21 (x). Equation (14) or (15), and 21 (y) = 21 (x) imply in (x) = in (y) for all i; n. Hence, 21 (y) = 21 (x) implies = 1. Equation (16) and 21 (y) = 21 (x) also imply that
v 2 (y)v 1 (x) equals its autarky value, which by Condition CA is strictly greater than one. Hence, Inequality (30) can never be satis…ed with equality. By continuity, Inequality (30) can never be satis…ed. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3. We decompose the proof of Proposition 3 into four parts. First, we prove the equivalence of (i) and (iii). Second, we prove the equivalence of (iii) and (vii). Third, we prove the equivalence of (iii) and (v). The proofs for the equivalence of (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii) are identical, and therefore omitted. Fourth, we prove the equivalence of (vii) and (viii). Throughout the proof, we impose The proof of Part II proceeds in 3 steps.
Step 1: The following inequalities are equivalent (a) 0
, and (e) 0 1 > 1 . 
11 (x) = 1
21 (x). Thus, Inequality (e) is equivalent to Inequality (a).
We conclude by showing that Inequality (c) is equivalent to Inequality (e). To show that Inequality (e) implies Inequality (c), we proceed by contradiction. 21 (x) imply t < t 0 , a contradiction. Hence, Inequality (c) is equivalent to Inequality (e).
Step 2: 
in both the original equilibrium (without 0 ) and the new equilibrium (with 0 ). Equations (31) and (32) yields E 1 =E 2 = E 0 1 =E 0 2 .
Step 3: (iii) w 0 s;1 =w 0 u;1 > w s;1 =w u;1 if and only if (vii) 0 1 > 1 .
By equation (16), we have Part III: (iii) w 0 s;1 =w 0 u;1 > w s;1 =w u;1 if and only if (v) L 0 k;1 (x) > L k;1 (x) for k = s; u.
In the proof of Part III, we normalize E 1 = E 0 1 = 1. By
Step 2 of the proof of Part II, we have E 0 2 = E 2 . Moreover, with E 1 = E 0 1 , we have w 0 s;1 =w 0 u;1 > w s;1 =w u;1 if and only if w 0 u;1 < w u;1 .
The proof of Part III proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: w 0 s;1 =w 0 u;1 > w s;1 =w u;1 implies L 0 k;1 (x) > L k;1 (x) for k = s; u.
From equation (16), we have
By Part II, w 0 s;1 =w 0 u;1 > w s;1 =w u;1 implies 0 1n (x) > 1n (x) for n = 1; 2. By equation (36), E 0 n = E n , and 0 1n (x) > 1n (x) for n = 1; 2, we have
E n 2 = w u;1 L u;1 (x) . (37) Equations ( which imply L 0 s;1 (y) < L s;1 (y). Since L s;1 (y)+L s;1 (x) = L s;1 , we therefore have L 0 s;1 (x) > L s;1 (x). Hence, w 0 s;1 =w 0 u;1 > w s;1 =w u;1 implies L 0 k;1 (x) > L k;1 (x) for k = s; u.
Step 2: L 0 k;1 (x) > L k;1 (x) for k = s; u implies w 0 s;1 =w 0 u;1 > w s;1 =w u;1 .
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that L 0 k;1 (x) > L k;1 (x) for k = s; u and w 0 s;1 =w 0 u;1 w s;1 =w u;1 . By Part II, w 0 s;1 =w 0 u;1 w s;1 =w u;1 is equivalent to 0 1 1 , which, by
Step 1 in the proof of Part II, implies 0 1n (x) 1n (x) for n = 1; 2. Therefore, w 0 s;1 =w 0 u;1 w s;1 =w u;1 implies
By equations (36) and ( 
is, therefore, positive. In the second term we know that h v 1 (x) v 1 (y) i 2 1 < 1, which follows from the fact that 1 > 0 is equivalent to < 1, and < 1 implies v 1 (x) < v 1 (y). In the second term we also have 11 (y) 2 = 1 + 12 (y) denote the ratio of country 1's revenue in the x sector to country 1's revenue in the y sector. Let k i (# i ) =
, where M T i (j) and M A i (j) denote the mass of sector j entrants in country i in a trade equilibrium for a given # i and in the autarky equilibrium (# A i = 1), respectively.
Step 1. k 1 is increasing in # 1 .
Equations (10) and (19) imply
w u;i w s;i
x y P n in (x) Q n P n P n in (y) Q n P n so that
Re-expressing Equation (47) as a function of the s and s, using equation ( 
Condition (50) and 0
x y 1 imply Condition (49), so that k 1 is increasing in # 1 .
Step 2. If 0 1 = 1 , 0 2 = 2 , and 0 1 1 , then # 0 1 = # 1 ( 0 1 ) # 1 ( 1 ) = # 1 .
Choose Q 1 P 1 as the numeraire, which implies that Q 2 P 2 is …xed given …xed trade shares and that 1n (x) Q n P n + 1n (y) Q n P n is …xed. Hence, a su¢ cient condition under which # 0 1 # 1 is 0 1n (x) 1n (x) for n = 1; 2. We have 0 11 (x) = 1
